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Abstract
Many biological, psychological and economic experiments have been designed where an organism
or individual must choose between two options that have the same expected reward but differ in
the variance of reward received. In this way, designed empirical approaches have been developed
for evaluating risk preferences. Here, however, we show that if the experimental subject is inferring
the reward distribution (to optimize some process), they will never agree in finite time that the
expected rewards are equal. In turn, we argue that this makes discussions of risk preferences,
and indeed the motivations of behaviour, not so simple or straightforward to interpret. We use
this particular experiment to highlight the serious need to consider the frame of reference of the
experimental subject in studies of behaviour.
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INTRODUCTION
While in physics it is standard, in biology we do not often think about frames of reference.
Suppose, for example, an experiment is set-up such that an organism (or person) must
choose between two options with the same expected reward but different variance in reward.
Further, suppose that the organism consistently chooses the safe bet (lower variance). In
this case, we may be tempted to label that organism as risk-averse. This makes sense from
our point of view or frame of reference. However, are we sure that the organism agrees on
the experimental set-up? Perhaps, from the frame of reference of the organism, the expected
rewards are not even perceived to be the same. If this is the case, we ought to be careful
with the conclusions we draw about why the organism is behaving a certain way. Though
this particular experiment was picked to make a point, hundreds of variations on it have
been carried out across several disciplines (see reviews1–3 and references therein).
Most theoretical attempts to understand behaviour start by assuming some sort of quan-
tity to be optimized4. In finance, classically it is return on investments under a certain
risk constraint5. In economics, it is (broadly defined) utility6. In biology, utility is usually
replaced with reproductive values and assumptions of rationality with natural selection7.
However, energy budgets and threshold reserves have also proved fruitful in understanding
risky behaviour8. Here, however, we divorce ourselves of any such quantities. Instead, we
shift attention to the information available in order to make decisions. This way the focus
is put on potential differences in beliefs between experimenters and those on whom they are
experimenting. We are interested not in predicting traits or behaviours in experiments but
in the conclusions we can and cannot draw from them.
In this paper, as is standard in statistical decision theory, we assume that the organism
or person being studied is sampling their environment and updating their beliefs9–12. In
particular, in the experiment described above (and below, in more detail), we suppose that
for each of the options the organism is inferring the probability of receiving a reward at
any instance. Our analyses show that, given infinite time, the organism can indeed infer
correctly this probability. In other words, the organism will agree with the experimenter on
the experimental set-up (which is to say, agree that the expected rewards of each option are
equal). However, we then go on to show that in finite time such agreement will never be
reached. This is clearly important as all experiments, by nature, have a fixed end-point. In
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light of this, we point out that it is not so simple to infer risk preferences, as is often done,
from these types experiments. The problem, as we point out, arises from the experimenter
and experimental subject having different frames of reference.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section we go into more detail
on the broad class of experiments we are using to demonstrate our point. Following this we
introduce the inference problem and prove convergence to the true probability of receiving
a given reward given infinite time. Next, noting that real experiments are finite, we show
that such a convergence does not occur in this case. Further, we show that the ramification
of this is that the experimenter and experimental subject do not agree in finite time on the
parameters of the experiments. Otherwise put, for any finite number of trials the organism
(or person) being experimented on will not believe that the expected rewards of each option
are equal. Finally, we summarise our findings and consider their broader implications.
EXPERIMENTAL PROBLEM
To motivate our problem, we consider an experimental design where an organism is
presented with two choices. One choice (called an arm) leads always (i.e.with probability
pˆ1 = 1) to a fixed reward of c. The other choice (the other arm) leads with probability pˆ2
to a reward of a and (1 − pˆ2) to a reward of b. The experiment is designed such that the
expected reward is the same on both arms. This leads to,
c = pˆ2a+ (1− pˆ2)b. (1)
In this way, from the point of view of the experimenter, if only expected values are used then
the organism should be indifferent to each arm. In light of this, in order to make decisions
the organism ought to consider the variances in rewards. For an excellent (and extensive)
review of these types of experiments see1. However, as we show below, from the point of
view of the organism, the expected rewards are not always equal.
INFERENCE PROBLEM
Suppose an organism is attempting to infer the distribution of two possible pay-offs on
an experimental arm of the type described above. In particular, by sampling the past pay-
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offs they are attempting to infer, in a Bayesian manner, the probability p of receiving g
and the probability 1 − p of receiving h. In order to do this, both a prior distribution
and likelihood function will be needed to form a posterior distribution for p. To this end,
suppose s successes and f failures (with regards to receiving g) are observed. In this case,
the likelihood that p = x will be given by
Pr(s, f |p = x) =
(
s+ f
s
)
xs(1− x)f . (2)
To encode any previous knowledge we choose the conjugate prior of the binomial distribution,
the beta distribution, which is given by:
Pr(p = x) =
xα−1(1− x)β−1
B(α, β)
, (3)
where B(α, β) is the beta function with β > 0 and α > 0. The benefit of using this prior
is two-fold. First, being the conjugate prior of (2), it makes possible the calculation of a
closed-form posterior distribution. Second, the hyper parameters α and β allow for the
encoding of an incredibly wide range of prior beliefs (for example α = β = 1/2 leads to the
Jefferys prior whereas α = β = 1 leads to the uniform prior). Finally, by a straightforward
application of Bayes rule, the posterior distribution is found to be given by
Pr(p = x|s, f) =
xs+α−1(1− x)f+β−1
B(α + s, β + f)
, (4)
which is also a Beta distribution. In this way, as the experimenter provides the organism
with additional pay-offs (one way or the other) the organism can infer a distribution about
p, the probability of receiving g. Note that the mean of (4) is given by
p˜ =
α
n
+ s
n
α
n
+ β
n
+ 1
, (5)
where n = s + f is the total number of trials thus far. In this way, if the true value of p is
pˆ, then by giving the correction ratio of s/n the organism can indeed infer the true value as
n gets large. Otherwise put
p˜∞ = lim
n→∞
α
n
+ s
n
α
n
+ β
n
+ 1
, (6)
= pˆ. (7)
Observe that the prior information contained in α and β is washed out (those terms go to
zero), so if the experiment is carried out correctly and for long enough (n→ ∞), the prior
beliefs of the organism do not matter.
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FINITE EXPERIMENTS
In the previous section we showed that if the experiment is carried out ad infinitum then
the organism can make the correct inference. With fixed rewards, they will therefore agree
that the expected rewards of each arm are equal. However, experiments are necessarily
finite. We now consider the implications of this.
Recall that in the experiments we are considering on one arm, from the point of view
of the experimenter, a pay-off of c is guaranteed. In other words pˆ1 = 1. On the other
arm, with probability pˆ2 a reward of a is given and probability (1 − pˆ2) a reward of b. The
experiment is designed such that
c = pˆ2a+ (1− pˆ2)b, (8)
so that, with perfect knowledge (the frame of reference of the experimenter), there should
be no preference for either arm if decisions are based solely on averages.
However, from the point of view of the organism, at trial n the estimated p˜1 (setting
s = n in (5)) will be given by
p˜1 =
α
n
+ 1
α
n
+ β
n
+ 1
, (9)
whereas p˜2 will be estimated by
p˜2 =
α
n
+ s
n
α
n
+ β
n
+ 1
, (10)
assuming the same initial prior for both arms. Hence, for the organism to believe that the
average pay-off on each arm is the same the following equality must hold:
cp˜1 = p˜2a + (1− p˜2)b, (11)
which, using (9), (10) and simplifying is equivalent to
c =
(
α + s
α+ n
)
a+
(
β + n− s
α + n
)
b. (12)
Using (8) on the left-hand side this is in turn equivalent to(
pˆ2 −
(
α+ s
α + n
))
a+
(
1− pˆ2 −
(
β + n− s
α + n
))
b = 0. (13)
As a and b are, by design, greater than zero the above statement is only true if both cofactors
are equal to zero. In particular, it must be that
pˆ2 =
α+ s
α + n
, (14)
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and
pˆ2 =
α− β + s
α + n
. (15)
Note that both (14) and (15) can hold in only two ways. First, both may be true if β = 0.
However, in this case the prior (3) is not a true distribution. When β → 0 we can, in fact,
interpret (3) as a Dirac delta function at x = 1. Though in this case the entire problem is
trivial as we no longer have any uncertainty. Second, n may get arbitrarily large. However,
in this section we are interested in precisely when this does not happen i.e. when n remains
finite. In other words, in finite experiments (11) can never be true. The ramification of this
is that even though the experimenter designs the experiment so that average pay-offs are
equal, an organism that is performing these inferences will never agree in finite time. In
this way, discussions of risk-preference to explain these broad group of experiments may be
misleading.
DISCUSSION
Hundreds of experiments have been designed such that given two choices the expected
reward, but not the variance in reward, is equal on each choice1–3,13,14. This way experi-
menters attempt to infer risk preferences for organisms under a range of circumstances. If an
organism consistently chooses the option that has less variance in reward they are deemed
risk-averse. Conversely, if the organism chooses the option that has more variance they are
deemed risk-prone. While risk-averseness occurs most frequently, risk-proneness has also
been observed1. Here, however, we have shown that these labels may be misleading. More
importantly still, we have highlighted the importance of frames of reference in biology. In
particular, we have stressed the potential pitfalls of studying behaviour without considera-
tion of the point of view of the experimental subject. It makes, unfortunately, little sense to
say that an organism will not make decisions based on expected rewards simply because we
have programmed the experiment so that expected rewards are equal; there is no guarantee
that the organism perceives said rewards to be equal. This is akin to the problems encoun-
tered in anthropomorphising animal behaviour whereby our own beliefs or motivations are
projected onto non-human animals15,16.
Bayesian approaches to understanding animal behaviour and in particular the use of
statistical decision theory is of course nothing new7,9,17. Most studies, rightly so, have
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focused on predicting decisions or phenotypes. More recently, others have considered the
biological value of information itself10,11,18. Here, however, we focus instead on the limits
of what a Bayesian organism can know before making decisions in the above experimental
context. It is important to note that, unlike other studies, our work is divorced of any
quantities to be optimised in order to make decisions such as utilities, reproductive values
or energy budgets6,8,12,19,20. In this way, our work is about conflicting perceptions of the
experimenter and the organism and therefore any inferences the experimenter can make
about the organism, no matter what currency is optimised.
In this paper, we have assumed that the organism in question is performing a Bayesian
inference on the probability of receiving a certain reward. Starting with a general prior
distribution, and sampling past rewards, we explicitly calculated a closed-form posterior
distribution. A valid criticism, of course, is that organisms may not be behaving in a strictly
Bayesian way. Indeed, much work has been done on this very question21–23. However, as
the Bayesian solutions are the optimal ones, we should expect natural selection to have
moulded organisms that at least approximate Bayesian behaviour via so-called Rules of
Thumb7,9,24. A further criticism, which pervades all of Bayesian analysis, is our choice of
prior. Again we reiterate that it makes possible the calculation of a closed-form posterior.
More importantly, however, we emphasise the versatility of the Beta distribution afforded
by its hyperparameters α and β which can control its concavity, skewness, symmetry and
more. Further, for the particular values of α = β = 1/2 and α = β = 1 the Beta distribution
reduces to the Jefferys and standard uniform distributions, respectively. We believe these two
noninformative distibutions are particularly important for this study as, from the beginning
of the experiment, there is no reason to suspect the organism has bias towards any initial
value of p. For an extensive discussion of Bayesian prior choice, and in particular the use of
noninformative priors, see Chapter 3 of Berger25
With this set-up we found that while from the frame of reference of the experimenter
the two choices have the same expected reward, any Bayesian organism will never agree in
finite time. In light of this, we perhaps cannot appeal to differences in variance of reward to
explain behaviour in these experiments. We are not implying then that organisms are only
using averages to make decisions as in the elegant early work of Charnov26,27. Instead, we
are pointing out that for these broad class of experiments we may not be able to appeal to
variances so strongly as an explanatory variable.
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Though we have focussed on one class of experiments, our work points to the largely
overlooked problem of frames of reference in studies of behaviour. If there is a mismatch
between the beliefs of the experimenter and experimental subject, then we must be cautious
to not draw conclusions based solely on our frame of reference. The first step, as taken here,
is being conscious that such differences exist in the first place. For future work, it will be
important to quantify just how divergent beliefs are and link this with existing work (such as
in-built cognitive biases) on how organisms may in practice deal with these errors24,28. For
the particular experiments focused on here, it will be fruitful to consider explicit decision
rules and currencies in order to generate in silico data. Once done, it will be interesting to
see if decisions based on expected rewards, variances or a combination of both most closely
resembles the wealth of existing experimental data.
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